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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE J. BELL, et al, ) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
REED A* ELDER, RONALD 0. 
ELDER and ALLEN G. ELDER, 
and the City of Enoch, Ltd., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i No. 880202-CA 
) Priority No.: 14b 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court 
of Cache County, State of Utah 
Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Judicial Code of the Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 
entitled "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction" states as follows: 
(2) "The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
.... (h) cases transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." 
This appeal is taken from a Judgment rendered in the 
District Court of Cache County. It was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court, and is therefore 
properly before this Court, which has Appellate Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellants brought an action for breach of contract 
against the Respondents, in the First Judicial District Court 
of Cache County. That Court denied the plaintiffs-appellants 
any recovery, and granted Judgment in favor of the 
defendants-respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this Appeal are: 
1. Did the Court err as a matter of law in its finding 
#8, that the Respondents were not in breach of Contract 
because it was the Appellant's responsibility under the 
supplemental agreement to be in a position to put water to 
beneficial use before the Respondents had a obligation to 
perform under their contract. 
2. Did the Court err in its findings #9 that on October 
15, 1980 the Respondent's were in a position to furnish 
culinary water to the Appellant's property line pursuant to 
the terms of a supplemental agreement to a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
3. Did the Court err in its finding #10 that there was 
no value to installing water lines to the property until the 
Appellant's could put the water to beneficial use. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the summer of 1976, the Appellant Larry Bell was a 
Captain in the United States Air Force, assigned to Eileson 
Air Force Base, in Alaska. At that time the Respondents Reed 
and Ronald Elder were in the construction business and had 
been the successful bidders to refurbish the base family 
housing units. The Appellants and Respondents became 
acquainted through their joint church activities. (T-52) 
During this summer Appellants learned that Respondents owned 
200 acres in Cache County, Utah which they planned to develop 
as a multi-residential development. During the holiday 
season the Bell's visited his in-laws, Mr. & Mrs. Waldron 
in Logan, Utah. Mr. Waldron1s backround included a number of 
years as Vice-president of Logan Savings & Loan Association 
during which time Logan Savings had several business dealings 
with the Elders. (Tr. 188) Upon learning of the proposed 
development from his son-in-law, in January 1977, Mr. Waldron 
entered into negotiations with the Elders, who were also 
again in Utah, for the purchase of ten acres of this 
property. The culmination of those negotiations was Exhibit 
1, a Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated February 7, 1977, 
which had been sent to Appellants in Alaska for their 
signature. (Tr. 189, 190) The pertinent term of that 
contract is the following portion of paragraph 11: 
"The seller hereby agrees and warrantys 
to furnish water and electrical power, 
roads to this property by July, 1978. If 
Buyer is unable to obtain building permit 
by July, 1978 the Seller agrees to 
indemnify and repay this contract for six 
months". 
In the spring of 1977 the respondents undertook the 
development of the property by retaining Mr. Lund, an 
engineer, to do the work needed to obtain approval from the 
Cache county planning commission for a planned unit 
development. (Tr. 178) 
The former Cache county planning director, Kenneth 
Sizemore and Mr. Lund testified that the ten (10) acres 
purchased by the Appellants were part of this overall 
development, and the planned source of culinary water for the 
development was a well known as the "Griffin Well". It is 
clear from the testimony of Mr. Sizemore and Mr. Lund that 
this was the only planned source of water to Appellants 
property until November of 1979. (Tr. 27, 182) 
Mr. Sizemore further testified that in February of 1977 
the property purchased by Appellants was zoned agricultural, 
and required a minimum lot size of 10 acres to build a 
single family home. However, zoning regulations were amended 
after July 1978 to allow building on half acre lots, subject 
to approval by the planning commission, and only upon prior 
proof that adequate culinary water was available. (Tr. 28, 
29) The evidence of this availability of Culinary water was 
an appropriation document from the State Water Engineer. 
(Tr. 44,45) 
In November of 1978 a supplemental agreement, Exhibit 2, 
was executed by the Appellants and Respondents. Once again 
the terms of that agreement were negotiated between Mr. 
Waldron and the respondents, and subsequently mailed to the 
Appellants for their signature. (Tr. 191, 192) When the 
parties signed Exhibit 2, the following changed conditions 
existed: (1) the respondents had been unable to comply with 
the conditions of paragraph 11 of Exhibit 1; (2) The July 
197 8 Cache County zoning regulation changes were effective 
and no building permits were being granted without a showing 
by the State Water Engineer that adequate culinary water was 
available to the property; and (3) The ten acres purchased 
via Exhibit 1 had been divided into two, five acre plots, 5 
owned by the Appellants and 5 owned by the Waldrons, as noted 
in paragraph 1 of the supplemental agreement. Paragraph 4 of 
that agreement provided that if the sellers are unable to 
furnish these utilities, on or before October 15, 1980, the 
sellers agree to "indemnify and repay this contract within 
six months", ie by April 15, 1980. (Ex. 2) 
Mr. Sizemore's testimony also clearly evidences that the 
Appellants could not have obtained a permit to build on 
their five acres at the time the supplemental agreement was 
signed for reasons set forth in his letter Defendants 
exhibit 8, as well as in his testimony (Tr. 31, 32 & 34-35) 
Respondent Reed Elder testified that when he signed the 
supplemental contract, Respondents knew: (1) That the 
original 10 acres were divided into two five acre parcels; 
(2) That Appellant's could not get a building permit for 
construction on a five (5) acre parcel, (3) That respondents 
agreement to provide water to those five acre parcels was not 
dependent on the appellants ability to obtain a building 
permit. (Tr. 226, 227) He further testified that at the time 
the supplemental agreement was signed, the anticipated 
source of water for the Appellant's property was a certain 
"unnamed spring". (T-158), However at this time, that spring 
was not developed, and the Respondents would have had to 
build a catch system for the water, provided a way of 
diverting water out of the area, and to have taken the water 
from the catch system to the edge of Appellants property. 
(T-211, 212). He further testified that no catch system was 
built by Respondents, and none was built at all until 1983. 
The State Water Engineer for Cache County, Robert 
Farthingham, testified about the history of Respondent's 
application for water from this unnamed spring, the springs 
water flow, and about the beneficial use of this water. His 
testimony established that an application was originally 
filed by Respondents in June 1977 to appropriate water of the 
unknown spring under application #25-7169. In that 
application the Respondents stated that the beneficial use 
applied for was for the "irrigating of half an acre, using 
the water for one family, five cattle and horses". Pursuant 
to this application, Respondents were required to put the 
water to beneficial use by July, 1980. Because that had not 
been done, the State engineer on July 17, 1980 directed a 
letter to the Respondent, Ronald Elder advising him that he 
had fourteen (14) days to submit proof on the application or 
it would lapse. (Ex. 9, Tr. 88-90). Based upon this letter 
the Respondent Reed Elder, on July 31, 1980 requested a 
reinstatement of extension of time in which to prove up the 
application and noted in that request: 
"Use has been limited to only pasture 
watering due to county holding up our 
plans for development for the time. We 
plan use still in the future". 
The fact that Respondents had not put the water to 
beneficial use was supported by the stipulation of 
Respondents counsel that his clients did not have the water 
appropriated, and that it was never put to a beneficial use 
by the Respondents. (T-93,94) Subsequently on July 31, 1982 
Reed Elder submitted another request for a reinstatement and 
a extension of time in which to prove up the application. 
(Ex. 11) Based upon the records of the State Water 
Engineer, from the date the application was filed in 1977 
until July of 1982 nothing had been done by the Respondents 
to develop the unknown spring to use the water in a 
beneficial way. 
Mr. Farthingham also testified that on October 6, 1987 
he tested the adequacy of the water flow from this "unnamed 
spring". On that date the only improvement to the spring was 
a collection line system, apparently constructed in 1983 by 
a Ron Foster, running to his home. There was no holding tank 
or any other development of this unnamed spring. (Tr. 99) 
Mr. Farthingham was unable to adequately drain the system to 
measure the spring water flow because as the water drained 
from faucets in the home it became turbid. Mrs. Foster who 
was present during the test was concerned because she could 
not bathe the children or wash her clothes in the dirty 
water. (Tr. 84) Mr. Farthingham testified based upon the 
test which he was able to conduct, the water flow, measured 
out of three taps in the home, was 6.40 gallons per minute, 
which meant that the spring was probably flowing less than 
that. His conclusion was that the flow of the unnamed spring 
into the Foster home did not comply with the water engineer's 
recommendations for culinary water to a household. (Tr. 85) 
He also testified that there was no other point of diversion 
from the unnamed spring except to the Foster home, and that 
it was questionable whether an additional use of the water 
for other households could be made. (Tr. 99) Mr. Farthingham 
also testified that if water from the unnamed spring had been 
piped to Appellant's property line on October 15, 19 80, and 
had been terminated with a faucet above the ground, this 
would have met the requirement for putting the water to a 
beneficial use. (Tr. 108) 
Steve Weaver of Weaver Construction Co. testified 
regarding the construction necessary to bring the water from 
the unnamed spring to the Appellant's property line and its 
related costs. (Ex. #4) His testimony that there had been no 
substantial improvements of the water system corroborated 
that of Mr. Farthingham. (Tr. 128, 130) He further testified 
that a concrete holding tank capable of holding at least 3000 
gallons needed to be constructed (Tr. 131) , a 2k inch line 
running 2200 feet, would need to be installed at least 4 feet 
deep, (Tr. 130, 131), that substantial dynamiting and 
excavations would be required due to large rocks and 
conglomerated, (Tr. 129), that a pump station was required to 
get pressure of at least 40 pounds pressure in the line. (Tr. 
132) The total cost for the project was estimated to be 
$50,700.00, with a total construction time of approximately 
30 to 45 days. (Tr. 133, 134) 
Jay Griggs, a retired design engineer with the Corp of 
Engineers testified he had purchased property from the 
Respondents and had built his home on land located above that 
owned by Appellants. In building his home he had been 
involved in bringing a water system to his home, and had 
constructed his own 2,000 gallon holding tanks for his 
system. He testified that in his opinion the method and 
type of construction as outlined by Mr. Weaver was the 
correct one that was needed to bring water to the Appellant1s 
property. (Tr. 282, 287-289) He further testified that 
the use of explosives would be absolutely essential in the 
construction phase, and that a gravity flow system could not 
be established based on the differences in the elevation of 
the unnamed spring compared to that of Bell's property, and 
the difficulty in insuring an adequate water flow with such a 
system at that location. (Tr. 294, 295) Mr. Griggs further 
testified there were no other sources of storage for the 
unnamed spring water, in that the two water storage 
facilities in the area mentioned as potential storage 
sources in Reed Elder's testimony, stored water from other 
waters sources, were owned by persons or entities other 
than Respondents, and no agreements existed granting others 
use of their holding tanks. (Tr. 293,294) 
In contradiction to the testimony of Mr. Weaver and Mr. 
Griggs the Respondent Reed Elder, testified in support of 
the claim that Respondents were always able to furnish water 
to the property line of the Appellants pursuant to the 
requirements of Ex. #2. The essence of the Respondents 
position was that had the Appellants requested a building 
permit, that the Respondents would have then furnished water 
from the unnamed spring to the Appellant's property. (Tr. 
167) That Respondents did not run a water line to the edge 
of the property because the water rights would have been lost 
after an assignment of water had been made. When 
cross-examined, regarding the construction needed in October 
15, 1980 to bring the water line to the Appellant's property 
line, Reed Elder testified that he only would have had to 
build lateral drainage lines to a larger source of storage. 
(Tr. 169, 170) That the source of the needed water storage 
would have been what is called the Nephi commish spring. He 
further testified that the Respondents would have connected 
to that storage via a 1 inch line on the road. Once again 
however the Respondent (Tr. 158) testified that he had not 
put water from the unnamed spring to a beneficial use as of 
November 1978. That as of October 15, 1980, to provide water 
to the Appellant's property, because the spring was not 
improved, lateral drainage lines would have had to be 
installed to run water into a storage source, and then a 
line parallel and below the west side of the dirt road needed 
to be laid to the property. (Tr. 162, 170) This of course 
supported the opinion of Mr. Weaver that the best way to 
construct the water line was along that same road. The 
Respondent also agreed with the testimony of Mr. Weaver and 
Mr. Griggs that a pump system needed to be installed 
somewhere along the water line to push the water to 
Appellant's property. With regard to the water line, the 
Respondent testified that he felt he might have tried to 
connect a line from the storage source to an old 1 inch line 
that had previously been laid in the road although he was not 
sure if that line was in the ground or usable. (Tr. 172) 
Mr. Griggs' testimony on this issue was that the 1 inch line 
was no longer available, and had been partially removed, and 
had only been laid along the road to a depth of no more than 
11 to 12 inches rather than the four foot depth needed. The 
Respondent also acknowledged that a line larger than a 1 
inch line would have to be installed to handle the pumping 
difficulties. Mr. Elder further acknowledged (Tr. 173) that 
he did not own or have control over the commish water storage 
facility, or any other water storage facility in the area, 
and did not have any written agreements which would allow 
him, during any of the period of time in question, the use of 
any other water storage facility. The testimony of Reed 
Elder was clear that on October 15, 1980, Respondents had not 
put the water from the unnamed spring to beneficial use, had 
not perfected the water rights, had not done any improvements 
on the unnamed spring including building a storage facility. 
(Tr. 231) Mr. Elder on cross-examination also admitted that 
his first discussion about using a holding tank system 
belonging to somebody else for the storage of water from the 
unnamed spring was not until sometime between 1982 to 1985 
(Tr. 233) . 
The Appellant, Larry Bell testified that he was 
concerned with water being available to the property by the 
deadline contained in Exhibit #2 because the property was 
essentially worthless without water. (Tr. 57) Mr. Bell 
further testified that every year after his separation from 
the Air Force in June of 1977, he had discussed with the 
Respondent Ron Elder, the status of the watering system. (Tr. 
66) He further testified that after July of 1978, he had 
indicated to Ron Elder that he was going to list his property 
for sale, and that he needed water to do it. That after he 
had listed the property for sale in September 1981, there had 
been several inquiries concerning the property, but because 
of the uncertainty of the availability of water it could not 
be sold. (Tr. 67, 68, 134, 143, 147). Mr. Bell further 
testified he had paid $12,500 for the property. 
Dr. Lynn Davis, an Agricultural Economist testified that 
the value of the property as of the date of trial (October 8, 
1987) was $200.00 per acre. That when purchased the value of 
the property without water, etc was $500.00 an acre. (Tr. 
204) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The lower Court erred as a matter of law in its 
determination a condition precedent to Respondents obligation 
to furnish water to the property line was Appellant's 
responsibility under the supplemental agreement to be in a 
position to put water to beneficial use. 
POINT II, 
The lower Court ruled contrary to Utah law in making its 
finding that Respondent's were in a position to furnish 
culinary water to Appellant's property line pursuant to their 
obligation under paragraph 4 of the supplemental agreement. 
POINT III, 
The Court abused its discretion in finding there would 
be no value to the Appellant's by the Respondent's installing 
water to the property line based upon the evidence before the 
Court. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW' 
IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO RESPONDENTS OBLIGATION TO 
FURNISH WATER TO THE PROPERTY LINE WAS 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT TO BE IN A 
POSITION TO PUT WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE. 
In Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 06 P.2d 
1189 (Ut. 1980) the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"It is well - settled law that the 
parties to a contract may, by mutual 
consent, alter all or any portion of that 
contract by agreement upon a modification 
thereof. Where such a modification is 
agreed upon, the terms thereof govern the 
rights and obligations of the parties 
under the contract, and any 
pre-modification contractual rights which 
conflict with the terms of the contract 
as modified must be deemed waived or 
excused." 
The issue before the trial Court therefore, dealt with 
an interpretation of the terms and conditions of the 
supplemental agreement and whether Respondent's breached the 
contract by failing to perform according to its terms as 
modified. The Supreme Court In Mark Steel Corp. v. EIMCO 
Corp., 548 P.2d 892 (Ut. 1976)
 f noted that the: 
"Primary rule in interpreting a contract 
is to determine what the parties intended 
by what they said; the Court will not 
add, ignore, or discard words in this 
process, but will attempt to render 
certain the meaning of provisions in 
dispute by objective and reasonable 
construction of the whole contract." 
A determination of whether a breach of contract incurred 
in this case must focus on determining what the parties 
intended by the supplemental agreement. A review of that 
agreement and the testimony before the Court clearly reflects 
the following: 
1. That the supplemental agreement was intended to be a 
modification of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(Ex. 2) 
2. That the supplemental agreement was entered into 
because the Respondent's were having difficulty performing 
under the original terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(Ex. 2) 
3. That the Respondent's knew the original ten acre 
plot had been divided into two five acre plotsf that 
building permits would not be granted for the five acre plots 
and with this knowledge, agreed to supply at their cost 
culinary water to the Appellant's five acre plot. (Tr. 226, 
227) 
4. Paragraph 4 of the supplemental agreement 
specifically provides that if the Respondents were unable to 
furnish those utilities on or before October 15, 1980, then 
the Appellants would be indemnified and repaid under this 
contract within six months from October 15, 1980f i.e. by 
April 15f 1981. 
The terms and conditions of Exhibit #1 which were no 
longer applicable because by their nature they could not be 
when the supplemental agreement was entered into strictly 
relate to the provision under paragraph 11. Obviously the 
provisions of paragraph 11 of Exhibit 1 relating to the 
buyers obtaining a building permit by July 1978 etc., if 
still effective on November 3, 1978 when the supplemental 
agreement was signed, were waived by the supplemental 
agreement and no longer a condition to be considered by the 
Court. A review of the other terms of the supplemental 
agreement in no way negate the clear language regarding the 
Respondents responsibility and their liability upon their 
breach of the supplemental agreement. 
In Land v. Land, 65 P.2d 1248f (Ut. 1980) the Supreme 
Court noted that "where possible, the underlying intent of a 
contract is to be gleaned from the language of the instrument 
itself; and only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous 
need extrinsic evidence be resorted to." 
No such ambiguity was claimed to exist in this case, 
nor was any asserted. It is therefore submitted that, as a 
matter of law, the trial Court erred in reading into the 
language of this supplemental agreement a condition precedent 
to the Respondents obligation to perform, namely the 
condition that the Appellant's had to be in a position to put 
water to beneficial use before the Respondent's were 
obligated to furnish water to the property line of the 
Appellant's. 
POINT II, 
THE LOWER COURT RULED CONTRARY TO UTAH 
LAW MAKING ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT'S 
WERE IN A POSITION TO FURNISH CULINARY 
WATER TO APPELLANT'S PROPERTY LINE 
PURSUANT TO THEIR OBLIGATION UNDER 
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
A review of the testimony of Mr. Farthingham, and of the 
certified copy of file no. 25-7169 from the State Engineer's 
officef relating to the City of Enoch's applications for 
water rights from the unnamed spring, show: 
1. That on June 6, 1977r Ron Elder, filed an 
application to appropriate water for the City of Enoch. That 
the application was for the diversion of water from an 
unnamed spring to be used for the domestic purposes of one 
family, stock watering of five cattle and used from April 1 
to October 31 for irrigation. (Tr. 79) 
2. Subsequently, on July 17, 1980, a letter was sent to 
Ron Elder from the State Engineer advising him that, the 
City of Enoch had not complied with the requirements of the 
original application, and such compliance would have to be 
made by July 31, 1980, or a request for an extension of time 
would need to be filed to prevent the application from 
lapsing. (Ex. 9, R-208) 
3. On July 30, 1980, a request for reinstatement and 
extension of time was filed by Reed Elder. In that request, 
he noted that the work to improve the spring had not been 
done, and the water had not been put to beneficial use by 
July 31, 1980, because: 
"The use has been limited to only pasture watering due 
to County holding up our plans for development for the 
time... ." 
The State Engineer notified Ron Elder on August 29, 
1980, that an extension of time for filing proof of 
appropriation had been granted until July 31, 1982. (Ex. 10, 
R-209) 
4. Again, on May 28, 1982, because proof had not been 
submitted that the water had been put to beneficial use, the 
State Engineer sent another letter to Ronald Elder. This 
letter, once again, pointed out that there had been a failure 
on the part of the Elders to complete any development of the 
spring, and noted that the extension application would lapse 
unless a new request was filed. (R-10) 
5. That in response to that letter, an additional 
request for an extension of time was filed by Reed Elder on 
June 7, 1982. That in that request, the reason stated for 
the failure to complete the work of improving the spring, and 
putting the water to beneficial use was: 
"No further action has been taken since the last 
extension. We are still planning development in the 
future." (Ex. 11, R-210) 
6. The State Engineer advised Reed Elder in a July 8, 
1982 letter that the time to file a proof of appropriation 
was extended to the City of Enoch until July 31, 1985. A 
memorandum decision of the State Engineer accompanied this 
letter. In that memorandum the State Engineer advised the 
City of Enoch/Elders that they had not complied with the 
provisions of Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated, in that 
there was not a proper showing of diligence or reasonable 
cause for delay in proceeding with the proof on the 
application. (Emphasis acided) (R-210) 
7. In August of 1982, an additional change application 
was filed on behalf of the City of Enoch by Reec3 Elder. 
Paragraph 8 of that application provided that the diversion 
of the water was to be accomplished by the construction of a 
tunnel collection box and a pipeline to the place of use. 
The purpose of the application was to include two additional 
families. (R-211 & 212) 
8. Once again, on May 31, 1985, a letter was sent by the 
State Engineer to Reed Elder advising him that, as of that 
date, no proof of application of the water had been 
submitted, and that the proof due date was July 31, 1985. 
Thereafter, an election to file water users claim was duly 
filed by Reed Elder on behalf of the City of Enoch on July 
19, 1985. (R-215) 
Based upon the above, it is clear that the defendants 
had not taken any steps, or undertaken any construction on 
the unnamed spring to bring water to the plaintiffs1 
property, nor had they complied with the provisions of 
§73-3-12 U.C.A. as of May, 1985, let alone as of November, 
1980. Reference is also made to the testimony of Reed Elder, 
wherein he confirms he had taken no steps to develop the 
spring. (Tr. 231) 
In Sowards v, Meacher, 108 P. 1112, 1113, (1910) the 
Utah Supreme Court noted: 
"To constitute a valid appropriation of 
water, there must be: an intent to apply 
it to a beneficiary use, a diversion from 
a natural channel by a ditch, canal, or 
other structure, and an application of it 
to a useful industry within a reasonable 
time; the last mentioned element being 
the most essential." 
This case has been followed by other decisions where the 
issue was whether a party perfected an application for 
water. See Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d 363, 365 (1938), where 
the Utah Supreme Court also held: 
"The approval or rejection of the 
application is simply a preliminary 
matter and is not intended to, and does 
not, fix the rights of the parties before 
the State Engineer in such proceedings... 
If the application is approved, then 
the applicant must proceed to perfect his 
appropriation as provided by law. Until 
it is so perfected, he cannot be decreed 
or given present rights as under a 
completed appropriation. It may be that, 
although the application is approved, the 
applicant may not be able to perfect his 
appropriation. The mere approval of the 
application does not assure that an 
actual appropriation of water will 
result." (emphasis added) 
This position was further supported in United States v. 
District Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951). In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court again upheld the proposition that: 
"The right to appropriate or change the 
diversion of use of water is not complete 
until the appropriation or change has 
actually occurred, and hence the 
applicant cannot establish any rights 
under the application and have them 
adjudicated at the time the application 
is approved by the Court." 
It is clear, therefore, that in Utah, the approval of an 
application does not grant any ownership interest or right to 
the water in the person receiving the application, in this 
case, to the Elders, d/b/a City of Enoch. The testimony 
before the Court and certified records of the Water Engineer 
clearly establish that one application for an extension of 
time was filed prior to November, 1980, and one in 1982. 
Also, an application for a change of use was filed by the 
Defendants before any steps were taken by them in 1985 to 
prove their claim. The Sowards case clearly states that a 
diversion from a natural channel by ditch, canal, or other 
structure must be accomplished before there is a valid 
appropriation of water. It is, therefore, submitted, that 
the Defendants, as a matter of law, did not have a valid 
appropriation of water in November of 1980, nor were they in 
a position at that time to do so. Certainly they had no 
diversion of the spring from any natural channel by any 
ditch, canal, or other structure. It is therefore clear they 
were unable to furnish culinary water to the Appellant's 
property line on October 15, 1980, or on any reasonable date 
thereafter. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THERE WOULD BE NO VALUE TO THE 
APPELLANT'S BY THE RESPONDENT'S 
INSTALLING WATER TO THE PROPERTY LINE 
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The evidence presented to the Court on this issue was 
from Larry Bell's testimony that in September of 1981 he had 
listed the property for sale with Coleman Realty in Logan, 
Utah, but had been unable to sell the property because water 
had not been provided to the property. 
The only other evidence produced on the issue of value 
was that of Dr. Davis who testified that current use of the 
property was as marginal grazing land unfenced, and without 
water and other amenities. He placed the current value at 
$200.00 per acre. Dr. Davis, on cross-examination, also 
testified that the difference in the value of the property if 
it had water and services to it, compared to the property 
without would be the cost of actually 
bringing those utilities to the property. (Tr. 207) 
Therefore based upon Mr. Weaver's testimony about the cost of 
the construction to bring the water to the property, $50,700 
would be reasonable. 
Based upon the above uncontradicted evidence, it is 
clear that the Court abused its discretion in finding that 
there would have been no value to the Appellants by requiring 
Respondents to furnish the water to the property line 
pursuant to the supplemental agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's seek reversal of the trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Judgment. They request that this Court 
as a matter of law render its interpretation of the language 
of the supplemental agreement, and determine that the 
Respondents were required, at their expense, to furnish 
culinary water to Appellant's property on or before October 
15, 1980, and that their obligation was not subject to any 
condition being imposed on the Appellants. 
Appellant's further request that this Court, based upon 
the evidence, determine that both as a matter of law and 
factually Respondent's were unable to furnish culinary water 
to the property line of the Appellants pursuant to the terms 
of the supplemental agreement, and therefore reverse the 
Judgment of the lower Court and find that the Respondents 
were in breach of this contract. Further, while it would 
appear that the lower Court was involved in an "indulgence of 
paternalism" warned against by the Supreme Court in Park 
Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Ut. 1981) the Appellant 
should be awarded Judgment based upon the evidence for the 
$12,500.00 they originally paid for the property, together 
with applicable interest thereon, their costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees as provided by the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
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